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Abstract
Global investments have had great impact on malaria—these are now at risk of being 
reversed. Cambodia is where drug resistance historically emerges and spreads globally to 
drive resulting pandemics—we are currently watching history repeat itself. Despite large 
investments and recent success in driving down overall rates of malaria, high levels of resis-
tance to nearly all antimalarial drugs are now widespread in Cambodia. Malaria cases are 
again rising in both Cambodia and Vietnam. Nearly incurable malaria in this region is a real 
and present threat. Critical actions to prevent further spread of the emerging incurable para-
sites are: (1) Commitment and real sense of urgency through declaration of a “Public Health 
Emergency of International Concern” or a similar set of directives; (2) Establish leadership 
with sufficient authority, respect, expertise and operational funding; (3) Engage affected 
security forces to stop disease transmission and support elimination operations; (4) Utilize 
surveillance as a core intervention with result-based funding targeting malaria transmission 
foci with rapid and effective action. Immediate decisive action is needed in Southeast Asia 
to prevent the next malaria pandemic. This chapter highlights persistent gaps in the region 
with methods to address them. In 2015–2016, our collaboration with NIMPE pilot tested 
tools to intervene in actual forest transmission foci. Our study district saw a 96% decrease 
in malaria from 2014 to 2017, with the entire province seeing the largest decrease in Central 
Vietnam in this same timeframe. We describe methods to tackle transmission foci, with 
both an integrated prevention and treatment package. We call on all stakeholders to make 
changes to current investments to address this critical challenge.
Keywords: malaria elimination, multidrug-resistance, surveillance, information 
systems, public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC), Cambodia, 
Vietnam, Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS)
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1. Introduction
Considerable global and domestic investments have averted millions of malaria-attributable 
deaths since 2000 [1, 2]. Nevertheless, one person (usually a child) still dies every 1.2 min-
utes from this disease, with no reduction in mortality between 2015 and 2016 [1]. Progress is 
further threatened by failure to contain artemisinin resistance, as confirmed by the Regional 
Artemisinin Initiative (RAI) mid-term review [3]. In Cambodia, between mid-2014 and mid-
2015, Plasmodium falciparum (Pf) malaria increased by 65%, with further substantial rise in 
2017, especially along the border with Vietnam [4]. High rates of clinical treatment failures 
to nearly all antimalarial drugs—including artemisinin derivatives—are now widespread 
in the country [3] and there is evidence of its spread into southern Vietnam (from western 
Cambodia) [5]. Multidrug-resistant malaria parasites could cause a global health catastro-
phe if they were to spread to other countries, particularly malaria-endemic nations in Africa 
[4, 6–9]. Spread may be facilitated by international peacekeeping missions and migration for 
work [10–13]. Given available evidence of this current threat, urgent and decisive action is 
essential.
We are currently watching history repeat itself. In the late 1950s, resistance to the antimalarial 
chloroquine emerged in Cambodia. It eventually spread to and throughout Africa during 
the 1980s [14, 15], resulting in a two- to six-fold increase in malaria-related mortality [14]. 
Subsequent waves of resistance to two other antimalarial drugs followed the same pattern of 
spread [6]. It was not until the early 2000s, when international bodies finally took affirmed 
action against malaria, that mortality rates began to decrease globally. But as the World 
Malaria Report 2017 states: “although malaria case incidence has fallen globally since 2010, the rate 
of decline has stalled and even reversed in some regions since 2014; mortality rates have followed a 
similar pattern” [1].
Today, a two-fold increase in mortality [14] would cause in the order of 7 million malaria 
deaths over a decade. The threat will also be magnified by widespread resistance to insecti-
cides already reported in Africa [16] (again history is repeating itself, in the “malaria eradi-
cation” era of 1955–1972, it was DDT resistance [17]). The concomitant threat of insecticide 
resistance, particularly as it affects the efficacy of insecticide-treated bed nets (ITNs) and 
household spraying, is widely recognized.
Drug-resistant strains of malaria will likely spread to Africa much faster in the current era. 
Some security forces in Southeast Asia (SEA) are a reservoir of multidrug-resistant (MDR) 
malaria parasites due to their occupational risk. In 2010, 5% of Cambodian army person-
nel, screened for research purposes, tested positive for Pf [18] using DNA (PCR) screening. 
Additional testing revealed failure to the latest artemisinin-based combination therapy (ACT) 
used at that time [18]. Despite investment by the Bill and Melinda Gates (BMGF) to stop 
malaria transmission in these troops, the positive cases for Pf malaria had doubled to 10% by 
2016 [19, 20]. During this same time frame, more than 3300 Cambodian soldiers were deployed 
on UN peacekeeping missions—without prior adequate (PCR) screening for malaria—to 
eight countries, including five in sub-Saharan Africa [10, 21]. Such missions could lead to 
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rapid spread of resistance across the endemic areas of the world. Despite being an obvious 
conduit for the spread of multidrug-resistant (MDR) malaria, the use of standard malaria 
prevention measures has not yet been put into practice by most militaries in SEA. This is due, 
in part, to the fact that they are a neglected population receiving little aid [22].
The spread of disease by peacekeepers is well documented. For example, following the 2010 earth-
quake in Haiti, United Nations troops from Nepal were the source of a cholera epidemic with over 
730,000 cases and 8700 deaths, and an estimated economic cost of US$2.2 billion [10]. A single 
infected peacekeeper could potentially serve as the source for the next malaria pandemic [10].
A similar threat is posed by migration of workers from SEA to sub-Saharan Africa. For exam-
ple, nearly 20,000 Vietnamese are legally working in Angola [23], and an unknown number 
are there illegally. These migrants are importing malaria from Angola into Vietnam [13]; the 
converse could also happen. Chinese workers are employed in mining and construction indus-
tries in the forests of Cambodia. They are hard to access, and malaria prevention and treatment 
practices are of uncertain quality (CO, personal communications). It is quite probable that 
some workers will move on to the African continent, where there is huge Chinese investment 
in these industries. Due to the high burden of malaria in Africa, it is likely that malaria strains 
originating from Asia would go undetected until the next pandemic is underway.
With immediate decisive action, we believe the transmission of the MDR strains can be inter-
rupted approaching the 2020 target (see box, Table 1) [24]. The World Health Organization 
(WHO)’s declaration of a Public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) led to 
impressive increases in resources for both Ebola and Zika epidemics, and may be essential to 
address the current MDR malaria threat. Together, Ebola and Zika claimed fewer than 12,000 
lives [25]. Yet, with MDR malaria, millions of lives are at stake. In 2015, WHO published 
a document warning that MDR malaria “…has reached alarming levels in several areas of the 
GMS” and that malaria “…could become untreatable with currently available drugs within a few 
years” [24]. In 2014, Bill Gates commented: “There’s the potential for a real nightmare scenario 
here. If a strain of malaria that’s resistant to artemisinin were to spread to Africa”… “it would be the 
worst ever disaster in malaria control” [7]. Chris Plowe, former president of American Society 
of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, argues that, “The danger of untreatable malaria is real and 
Recommendations for rapid elimination of emerging incurable malaria
The world needs to focus efforts to eliminate incurable malaria strains by 2020. The critical remaining actions are:
1. Commitment and real sense of urgency through declaration of multidrug-resistant malaria as a “Public health 
emergency of international concern” or similar set of directives;
2. Establish response leadership with sufficient authority, respect, expertise and operational funding;
3. Engage affected security forces to stop disease transmission and support elimination operations;
4. Utilize surveillance as a core intervention with result-based funding to drive the targeting malaria transmission foci 
with rapid, localized and effective action.
Table 1. Critical actions to eliminate emerging incurable malaria strains.
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present” [6]. If the WHO’s call for “urgent action” is to be answered, a PHEIC or similar set 
of directives would be hugely important. The definition of PHEIC is “an extraordinary event 
which is determined to constitute a public health risk to other States through the interna-
tional spread of disease and potentially require a coordinated international response” [26–28]. 
We argue that almost incurable malaria in Cambodia, and now Vietnam, with the threat to 
other countries and regions, undoubtedly fits this definition. WHO contends the regulations 
were designed to address acute public health conditions and the public health community 
has known of the emergence and spread of multidrug resistance for a number of years [29]. 
We claim that if a PHEIC had been declared in 2014, when WHO first learned of high ACT 
treatment failure rates crossing into Vietnam, malaria would be nearly eliminated now in 
these countries. The new “extraordinary event” is a marked increase in malaria in eight prov-
inces of Cambodia in 2017, which is continuing in five provinces in early 2018 (CO, personal 
communication) despite substantial Global Fund resources in the region. Furthermore, in 
the province where parasites crossed into Vietnam, malaria was up 2.5 fold in 2017, with an 
extraordinary annual parasite index of about 55. It is not too late to call a PHEIC. If a PHEIC 
declaration is politically not achievable, a set of similar instructions could generate both com-
mitment and urgency. One example would be a US Department of Defense (DoD) directive 
[30]—this should be achievable, as malaria is the number one infectious disease threat for US 
troops [31] and the US DoD continues to invest large sums of money in new antimalarial drug 
and vaccine development. We are currently at risk of losing all drugs for both malaria prophy-
laxis and treatment, which should prompt a major investment in direct support of elimination 
of these strains. The current Defense Malaria Elimination Program [32] was intended by the 
lead author to be modeled after the DoD Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune 
Deficiency Syndrome Prevention Program (DHAPP) to Support Foreign Militaries directive 
[30]; instead it turned out to be just more research funding (CO, unpublished observations).
In the SEA context, the artemisinin-based drugs are only one of several classes of previously 
effective drugs. Over time, malaria parasites in Cambodia have accumulated multiple resis-
tance mechanisms against all of these drug classes. Global health stakeholders and donors 
must learn from past experience, and urgently recognize the continually evolving malaria 
parasites in Cambodia as an emergency that must be halted.
A short-term solution to the challenge is the return of malaria sensitivity to the prior artemisinin 
combination treatment (ACT) partner drug mefloquine (Lariam®) following its reintroduction 
in Cambodia. One expert predicts that continued mefloquine efficacy will be short-lived [33]. 
When used as a monotherapy, mefloquine remained efficacious for <5 years in the Thailand–
Cambodia border areas [34]; now, two years after its reintroduction in Cambodia as part of drug 
combinations, it fortunately appears to remain efficacious (CO, unpublished observations). It 
is currently being paired with artesunate, to which resistance has emerged, essentially leaving 
mefloquine again as monotherapy. Moreover, mefloquine is a drug greatly challenged because 
of both gastrointestinal and neuropsychiatric side-effects, which will undoubtedly affect com-
pliance (adherence, or people completing the recommended three-day regimen), as effective 
monitoring of adherence is lacking (CO, unpublished observations in northern and eastern 
Cambodia). Additional solutions are currently undergoing research, including one with a com-
bination of three drugs that are or were failing in other combinations [35]. In addition, molecular 
marker evidence reveals that the theory of reciprocal cross-resistance is probably not a factor 
[36]. Another proposed solution is to return to the use of drug combinations that previously 
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proved inefficacious in initial clinical trials in Cambodia [37]. However, these are unlikely to be 
more than very temporarily solutions. When international leaders and policy-makers, ministries 
of health, donors and the philanthropic and scientific communities understand the gravity of this 
situation, only then can there be a concerted, effective push to finally eliminate malaria in SEA.
Under the late Alan Magill’s previous leadership, the BMGF made great strides in its ambi-
tious goal to eradicate malaria; tragically, Dr. Magill passed away before his plan was fully 
implemented [38, 39]. Two of his key concepts are presented in Figures 1 and 2.
In 2014, Bill & Melinda Gates, Alan Magill and a team visited the epicenter of MDR malaria in 
western Cambodia. In Gates’ notes from that trip, they reported the threat as outlined above [7].
Recently, Mr. Gates has proposed a global strategy to prepare for “the next epidemic” [41]. 
We developed “Recommendations for rapid elimination of emerging incurable malaria” 
(Table 1) based on his article. A key recommendation of Mr. Gates is that it should be “coor-
dinated by a global institution given enough authority and funding to be effective…”. He also noted 
that cooperation among various nations’ militaries should be a priority. In 2014, SEA military 
Figure 1. Three potential future trajectories for malaria as per the late Alan Magill from his “Accelerate to Zero” 
presentation [40]. He recommended to “bend the curve.” One of his specific goals was Pf elimination “East of Bangkok” 
by 2020. 1 and 2 in circles represent additional reduction of malaria cases in the timeframe represented (reproduced with 
permission from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation). We are currently on the resurgence curve in Cambodia and may 
soon be worldwide if effective action is not taken.
Figure 2. Mobilize for action. How to accelerate the trajectory to malaria eradication by concurrently achieving three 
goals: (1) identifying the human reservoir of infection in asymptomatic persons + (2) eliminating the human parasite 
reservoir + (3) combined with geographically and temporally targeted transmission prevention and strengthened 
surveillance and response [40] (reproduced with permission from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation).
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leaders met twice and indicated their willingness to support malaria elimination efforts [42], 
but there has not been effective funding forthcoming to protect troops from malaria nor for 
them to assist with the much needed effective response. Another meeting was held in 2016, 
but the only available funding was for research (P. Smith, personal communication), not for 
an effective treatment and prevention package at scale, nor the needed direct support for 
malaria elimination operations that militaries can provide. A well-led military response to the 
MDR malaria crisis would be a large part of the solution to achieve WHO goals.
Gates also called for a warning and response system to enable fast decision-making. A surveil-
lance/information system of the sort envisioned in a recent background paper [43] should be 
rapidly implemented across the SEA region. This is not an untested assertion, as a simple 
smart phone-based system has already been successfully pilot tested in central Vietnam [44]. 
A key 2016 finding was that each household had received an average of 4.3 treated bed nets; 
despite very high coverage at the household level (where there is little or no transmission), 
only 16% reported using a treated net when traveling to areas of elevated risk [9]. Similarly, 
low rates of treated net usage have been anecdotally observed by authors in four provinces 
in Cambodia recently and in other SEA countries [45, 46]. A smart phone-based system can 
provide quality monitoring including picture and video evidence to help leadership ensure 
that those in need of treated bed nets are actually using them and that treatments are being 
completed [44].
The mechanisms underlying emergence of drug resistance are not fully understood and 
are believed to be multifactorial [47]. A key factor leading to resistance may be incomplete 
treatment—effective adherence monitoring is still not in place and must be a priority. Until 
recently, Vietnam made standby ACT-treatment available to forest-goers, during which par-
tial treatment may frequently occur. The same problem arises when people with symptoms of 
fever are provided antimalarial drugs by individuals who do not stress the need for complete 
treatment (e.g., private drug sellers and others). As artemisinin-derivative components have 
decreased efficacy in the GMS, a greater selection pressure is placed on the partner drugs. 
Whenever possible, all combination therapies should include a fully curative dose of each 
component, which, for short half-life drugs, requires seven days of therapy. Seven days of 
monitored treatment is feasible in the region if patients are renumerated for lost work time.
The role of mosquito vectors in the spread of drug-resistant malaria is also not fully under-
stood. In the GMS, it is clear that malaria transmission is closely associated with the forest and 
forest-fringe vectors, i.e., An. dirus s.l. and An. minimus s.l. Fortunately, extensive insecticide 
resistance has not yet emerged to these vectors. Humans are likely the main transmission res-
ervoir as they can infect mosquitoes for months if not cured of their malaria infection, while 
mosquitoes are relatively short-lived (lifespan of Anopheles female: three to four weeks) [48].
Lastly, no child should currently die from malaria in Africa, as all strains there are fully curable 
with ACT treatments. The high death rates are due to ineffective prevention and/or delayed/
inappropriate treatment as a result of weak health infrastructure. Targeted and decisive action 
should be taken in Africa to reduce the overall public health impact of malaria while the most 
commonly used antimalarial drugs remain effective. This can be done using modifications 
of the same approaches outlined in this chapter. Because of the threat to Africa, where the 
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combination of both ineffective drugs and weak health infrastructure will lead to another 
public health emergency, decisive actions must be taken immediately in Asia.
2. Achieve both local and international commitment and a real sense 
of urgency—a “Public Health Emergency of International Concern 
(PHEIC) or similar set of directives”
In the 1980s, nearly incurable malaria parasites emerged on the Thailand-Cambodia border. 
Mefloquine failed four years after introduction in 1985 [34]. The only treatment option at the time 
was quinine-tetracycline [49]. Quinine is a very poorly tolerated drug requiring three daily doses 
for seven days—meaning almost no one completes it (e.g., poor adherence or compliance) unless 
every dose is monitored. Fortunately, artemisinin derivatives and other drugs became available—
all of which either did not work at the time of their introduction (e.g., lumefantrine, pyronaridine 
[50–52]) or have lost therapeutic efficacy (e.g., piperaquine [53]). Presently, the pipeline of new 
antimalarial drugs is not keeping pace with the emergence of drug resistant strains [37]. Now in 
Cambodia, mefloquine sensitivity has returned, but is likely to be short-lived (e.g., two more years 
or less), by which time we may be back to quinine-doxycycline (a tetracycline derivative). We 
have recently learned that the Vietnam Border Guard Forces have provided doxycycline prophy-
laxis to more than ½ million people over the last decade (CO, personal communication)—which 
means this drug might as well be rendered ineffective by now. Identification of the combination 
partner drugs or the new seven-day regimens must be a priority. Ineffective or incomplete treat-
ment will result in people carrying malaria parasites, an increased transmission reservoir, cases 
and deaths. The US Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reported the direct costs 
for malaria (e.g., illness, treatment, premature death) to be at least $12 billion per year. The cost 
in lost economic growth is many times more than that [54]. If key leadership does not act rapidly 
and effectively now, these costs will be much higher. If a PHEIC was declared, these emerging 
incurable parasites can be rapidly eliminated using the approaches presented here. If not, we will 
likely have a slight upgrade of “business as usual” with this critical window of opportunity lost.
As advocated early in this chapter and by others [4, 55] (Rear Admiral C. Chinn, personal 
communication), we believe that the best way to handle this threat is to declare a PHEIC or 
similar directives. The failure of nearly all drugs in Cambodia, the crossing of these para-
sites into Vietnam and current increasing Pf malaria in Cambodia arguably constitute such 
an “extraordinary event” based on the three prongs identified by the International Health 
Regulations (IHRs). First, the failure of standard treatment options for deadly communicable 
disease constitutes a public health threat. While all forms of malaria are still currently treatable, 
the imminent failure of last ACT poses a public health risk, especially for sub-Saharan Africa. 
This situation would make the deadliest form of malaria untreatable, which would at least be 
comparable to the “events” that have triggered previous PHEIC declarations [56, 57]. Second, 
drug-resistant malaria is at risk of spreading internationally as a result of the substantial 
presence of security personnel from the GMS in sub-Saharan Africa such as Cambodian and 
military personnel and workers traveling to Africa. There is greater risk that these challenging 
new parasites will reach both India and Bangladesh soon. These countries have substantial 
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numbers of their troops in Northeast India and Eastern Bangladesh, where these parasites will 
first arrive, and are currently the 2nd and 3rd largest contributors to international peacekeep-
ing missions [58]. Third, a coordinated international response is absolutely required to manage 
this risk. In SEA, there are now fortunately few deaths from malaria. Leadership here has other 
pressing health issues to address, with malaria now becoming a low priority. Both interna-
tional leadership and assistance for the countries involved, especially with security forces, is 
needed to ensure proper response to this peril most directly threatening Africa.
3. Establish mission leadership with enough authority, respect, 
expertise and functional funding
We urge Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the US government and the Asian Development 
Bank to fill the leadership vaccuum at the operational level, as the newly resistant parasites, 
if they reach Africa, will make the goal of malaria eradication very much more challenging. 
We believe these are the only organizations with the authority, resources, and respect to make 
this happen. Local governmental personnel with the responsibility for the mission must be 
empowered. Future, on-the-ground non-govermental leadership must be carefully selected 
to ensure they have the needed commitment, authority, respect, and expertise to be effective 
[41]. The WHO Emergency Response to Artemisinin Resistance (ERAR) in the GMS hub was 
established in 2013 [59] to strengthen the response to artemisinin resistant malaria by coor-
dinating action, technical leadership and catalyzing resource mobilization. The ERAR hub 
was “transitioned” to the Mekong Malaria Elimination program in 2016 [60]. Why contain-
ment failed must be objectively evaluated to insure that the new leadership is effective. Public 
Health Emergency Operations Centers could be a good solution [61].
The elimination of malaria is not as difficult as it appears on the surface. It boils down to pre-
vention and effective treatment of malaria patients in or traveling from the actual transmission 
foci. GMS original forest areas are now shrinking, which is making the mission easier. Bill Gates 
himself and others have effectively outlined the actions needed [41, 55]. Cambodia is the epicen-
ter of emerging incurable malaria; the needed policies and guidelines are now in place in this 
country [24, 62]. What is needed now is quality implementation of relatively straightforward 
interventions in the field. In 2013, the RAI, a three-year $100 million grant, was launched by the 
Global Fund (GF) to contain artemisinin-resistant malaria (http://www.raifund.org/). Many of 
the key impediments were clearly outlined in the 2015 RAI mid-term report [3]. Unfortunately, 
we were denied permission by Global Fund leadership to publish the conclusions and recom-
mendations from their report in this chapter (A Joubert, personal communication). We were 
allowed to publish only the map, which revealed Pf was going up at that time (Figure 3).
With a new leadership team, given a passion for the mission, along with authority, expertise 
and sufficient/effective funding, we strongly believe that Pf elimination goals can be achieved 
near to the WHO targets in the GMS [24]. Determining if the RAI mid-term review results have 
been effectively addressed should be top priority [3]. The results of routine, truly independent 
quality monitoring from the field must be a key component. Quality monitoring must focus on 
what is most important (e.g., effective prevention and treatment in actual transmission foci). 
Targeted supportive supervision for partners experiencing implementation challenges is also 
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essential to achieve elimination targets. Our new “Red-to-Green, Keep-It-Green” Information 
System is an example of the ability to provide near real-time feedback to leadership with 
image and video documentation of what is really happening in the field (see Section 5.1.1) for 
both independent quality monitoring and supportive supervision.
GF is by far the largest investor in malaria in the region; their funding, however, is not nearly 
as effective as it could be for malaria in the GMS, especially in Cambodia. GF has evolved to be 
a mega-donor. As with all large organizations, this brings bureaucracy; in addition, it has the 
added challenge of accountabilty for very large sums of money. Malaria in the GMS represents 
only a small part of the overall portofolio, but has the same rules that apply to all funding, 
impacting timely and effective intervention implementation. For example, a sub-contractor 
receiving Presidential Malaria Initiative (PMI) funding reports PMI funds are hard to use, but 
Figure 3. Pf caseload increase between July 2014–June 2015 [3]. Malaria was again rising in 2017–2018 in several 
provinces of Cambodia.
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GF funds are 10 times worse (CO, person communication). GF funding is focused on process 
and financial accountability, not on timely, effective and quality implementation of interven-
tions in transmission foci despite WHO’s call for “urgent action” [24]. For example, in a province 
in Eastern Cambodia where malaria increased 2.5 fold in 2017, nets were first delivered to the 
lower risk villagers in early 2018 and the high risk mobile and migrant populations will not 
receive nets until at least mid-2018 following the set process. Furthermore, in the villages, a fixed 
number of treated nets are being provided, resulting in households with more than one forest-
goer often not having enough nets. Response to new cases is in the village, which does not make 
sense with transmission being in the forest. Malaria in the region is an occupational disease 
for those working in the forest, while most programs have been designed around presumed 
household exposure. Lastly, Cambodia returned more GF funds unused than any other country 
in the region in the cycle that ended in December, 2017 (CO, unpublished observation).
Available financial resources must be used much more effectively. Despite large amounts of 
funding in the region, basic intervention coverage in forest transmission foci is poor. There 
is markedly disproportionate financial support provided for partner organizations in the 
region. Each international support staff often costs hundreds of thousands of dollars per per-
son per year, including overhead and allowances. Yet, incentives for good performance are not 
allowed for malaria-endemic country government staff who have salaries that are not enough 
for subsistence. For example, district-level health staff typically make $200–$300/month, while 
salaries for NMCEP staff at the national level are in the range of $300–$1200/month. While GF 
guidelines do allow for incentives to government employees [63], we have been informed 
that this policy does not apply in the GMS (CO, personal communications). Undoubtedly, 
this leads to resentment by those expected to execute malaria elimination operations, which 
are often beyond their normal duties and may put their own job security at risk. A main 
argument against incentives is “sustainability in the context of decreasing external financing 
for malaria” (The RAI-Regional Steering Committee, personal communication), despite 7+ 
million lives being at risk. Malaria “East of Bangkok” can be rapidly eliminated, making long-
term sustainability a non-issue if the recommendations in this chapter are followed.
Leadership must also address many conflicts of interest, which are often subtle in this setting, 
especially with research. As per the former Pacific Command Surgeon, “[elimination of malaria] 
is an action problem, not a research problem” (Rear Admiral C. Chinn, personal communica-
tion), yet the US Army continues to do only research with substantial increases in funding for 
malaria. Researchers, to be successful, must enhance their own curriculum vitae and malaria 
research usually requires substantial disease transmission, resulting in disincentives to facili-
tate elimination. The lead author is most familiar with the malaria research being conducted 
by the US military, which is expensive, frequently wasteful, often duplicative, many times 
not impactful and sometimes actually counterproductive (CO, unpublished observations). A 
mechanism must be in place for research prioritization, independent review by experts who 
understand the needs and challenges, and for timely action based on important findings [20].
The lead author of this chapter helped to identify funding to protect security forces in the GMS 
from malaria. His intent was for this to be modeled after the DoD directive to prevent and treat 
HIV-AIDS [30]. Following the realization that new funding was more for research, the follow-
ing feedback was received … “I am aware that you’re in disagreement… want to see us more 
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aggressively target malaria elimination. As we’ve discussed, we see this ultimately as a host 
country responsibility…” (M. Fukuda, personal communication). Many in the region are being 
misled that researchers are actually helping to protect host country militaries from malaria, when 
in practice, only small research studies are being conducted to fund research staff and to generate 
publications, with no action being taken based on the results. Leadership must take corrective 
action as militaries are both a key malaria transmission reservoir and can direclty support elimi-
nation operations (see Section 4). Malaria is the largest infectious disease threat for the US DoD 
and action can be taken as exemplified by an HIV prevention program to support foreign militar-
ies and a DoD directive [30]. The US Army should engage with an institution that is not research-
focused to rapidly help eliminate the emerging incurable parasites and ensure than any malaria 
research funding in the region is focused on rapidly stopping falciparum malaria transmission.
Vietnam can serve as an example for effective leadership and health system strengthen-
ing leading to rapid reduction and preparation for elimination of malaria. With intensive 
implementation of malaria control measures over the past decades, the burden of malaria is 
decreasing rapidly, and the disease is becoming increasingly focal. Between 2000 and 2016, 
the number of malaria cases was reduced by 94.4% (74,316 down to 4161) and number of 
deaths reduced by 97.9% (142 down to 3) [64] (Figure 4).
Key factors leading to the success of the program are as follows: (1) strong commitment and sub-
stantial investments by the Government of Vietnam and its international development partners, 
(2) a strong and comprehensive health network from central to community levels, (3) a vertical, 
well organized and functional program (e.g., health staff specialized in malaria control activities 
are working effectively at all levels down to village), (4) extensive vector control measures with 
high coverage of ITNs and indoor residual spraying (IRS), (5) availability of highly effective medi-
cines for malaria treatment at all levels, (6) engagement of multisectoral partners (see Section 4.2).
Although great success towards malaria elimination has been made, Vietnam is now faced 
with a critical window of opportunity to achieve the elimination of malaria as mandated in 
Figure 4. Decreasing malaria transmission trends in Vietnam between 2000 and 2016.
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the “National Strategy for Malaria Control and Elimination 2011-2020 and Vision for 2030” 
[65]. This critical window includes the following factors: (1) efficacious antimalarial combina-
tions still exist but are failing fast; (2) potent tools for vector control are available but could be 
undermined quickly by the development of insecticide resistance; and (3) financial support 
from external funding partners continues to flow but is likely time bound. The Government of 
Vietnam will also need to take bold steps and intensify national malaria elimination efforts to 
ensure that malaria is eliminated from Vietnam for good before this window of opportunity 
closes.
In summary, with a new leadership team, given a passion for the mission, along with author-
ity, expertise and sufficient/effective funding, we believe WHO’s Pf elimination goals can be 
achieved near the set target date of 2020. Vietnam is an example of a success story, which can 
serve as a model for other country programs. However, Vietnam cannot eliminate malaria 
until neighboring countries also do so. We urge BMGF, Asian Development Bank (ADB), PMI, 
the US military and other philanthropists to take action to address the challenges presented 
here in order to drive malaria elimination in the region.
4. Engage security forces to prevent disease spread and support 
elimination operations
4.1. Security forces as a neglected population contributing to the malaria 
transmission reservoir and spread of drug-resistant parasites
The GMS security forces are a neglected population group that are at greater risk of con-
tracting malaria, [22, 63] and serving as a transmission reservoir [20, 66]. They are certainly 
spreading the disease in the region and are the most obvious direct conduit of the current 
parasites to Africa [10]. In Africa, peacekeeping forces, deployed from many malaria endemic 
countries, work together, which could cause rapid spread of the new drug-resistant parasites. 
PCR-based screening of UN peacekeeping troops from Cambodia was initiated in 2015 (PCR 
is the only method sensitive enough to detect asymptomatic parasite carriers). In 2017, it was 
learnt that this practice had been discontinued at some point, but with inputs from key lead-
ers to WHO, this was fortunately re-initiated. This process must be monitored so that lapses in 
screening do not recur. It must also be extended to include other militaries in the region that 
soon will also be at risk of spreading these parasites.
We have evidence that the Cambodian army has high malaria infection rates, and not been 
receiving optimal malaria prevention or treatment, and are serving as the primary malaria 
transmission reservoir in an area of Northwestern Cambodia [67, 68]. In 2010, 5% of troops 
were reported positive for Pf by PCR during a malaria screening [68]. The study for which the 
screening was done provided direct evidence, although with small numbers, early warning 
that dihydroartemisinin-piperaquine was failing as treatment. The lead author urged the US 
Army to act to stop transmission in these troops, but to no avail. He then contacted BMGF 
in 2012 to provide funding to stop transmission in these troops; funding was awarded, but 
not used until 2016, by which time the number positive for Pf had doubled to 10% [20]. It is 
unclear why the US Army does not act much more quickly given the threat to US troops.
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In the 2016 intervention study, Pf transmission was stopped, providing direct evidence that 
the Cambodian army was the primary Pf transmission reservoir in the area of the study [20]. 
We believe there is sufficient evidence to scale the interventions that were proven to be effec-
tive (e.g., permethrin-treated uniforms, see Table 2). The impressive results from the study, 
however, have unfortunately not yet been acted upon.
Additional evidence of security forces being a transmission reservoir comes from the area 
where the most resistant parasites cross-border into Vietnam. Forest rangers in the Bu Gia 
Map National Park screened positive for Pf malaria at about ~11% for Pf (very similar to the 
Cambodian army in Northwestern Cambodia, see above) [66]. This population is probably 
a significant malaria transmission reservoir in this area. From the publication, the rangers 
appear neither to be receiving effective prevention measures nor routine screening and treat-
ment. No funding in the GF 2018–2020 budget was allocated for such activities in this popula-
tion. The only way it will be possible is to request unused GF year-end funding be reallocated, 
which is not an easy process (CO, personal communication). Furthermore, since permethrin-
treated uniforms are not yet WHO-prequalified (despite standard of care in Western militar-
ies and recent impressive evidence in the Cambodian army), GF funding may not be able to 
be used for this intervention (CO, personal communications).
Permethrin is very inexpensive, well-tolerated, and widely used for uniform treatment by 
Western militaries for malaria prevention [69]. The evidence for efficacy of treated uniforms/
clothing is summarized in Table 2. Based on available evidence, and in light of emerging incur-
able parasites and pyrethroid sensitivity of the main transmitting mosquitoes (M. Macdonald, 
personal communication), we believe treated uniforms should be rapidly scaled up for all 
security forces in the GMS as one component of an integrated vector control package.
In Cambodia, there are three types of government security personnel working in the forest—
army, forest rangers, and border police; each falling under different ministries. We are aware 
of a pilot project in Northwestern Cambodia where an ADB-funded project is working with 
all of these groups for malaria prevention and treatment (CO, personal communications). We 
believe this initiative should be taken to scale as quickly as possible in the region.
4.2. GMS security forces can provide direct support if given a mission and properly 
resourced
The Vietnam People’s Army, including the Vietnam Border Defense Force, provides an excel-
lent model for security personnel supporting health interventions. From 2005 to 2015, the 
Combined Military Medical Program contributed to improve health, hunger elimination and 
poverty reduction [75]. Example accomplishments for health include: (1) vaccination of 5.1 
million children with Ministry of Health-recommended vaccines, (2) family planning for more 
than 3.7 million people, (3) malaria prevention education for more than 1.8 million people, 
and (4) IRS of nearly 26 million square meters of housing with National Malaria Control 
Program with provided pyrethroids.
More than 1300 health stations were strengthened with military staffing, including 1044 
health stations in remote and isolated areas (>10% of all nationwide; in locations where it is 
hard to recruit civilian staff). The system includes 152 border clinics, which also serves as a 
border surveillance system for early detection of epidemics.
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First author 
and study 
location
Level of 
evidencea
Study 
population
Study Designb Intervention groups 
(n)
Control group (n) % Failure 
interventionc
% 
Failure 
control
Protective 
efficacy (95% 
CI)d
Reference/
notese
Moore (2019), 
Tanzania
1 Public 
Service 
Corps
CR Permethrin-treated 
uniforms (n~500), 
DEET (N~250)
Untreated uniforms 
(n~500), DEET 
placebo (N~250)
NYA NYA NYA 1
Wojnarski 
(2016), 
Cambodia
2 Military CR Permethrin-treated 
uniforms (n = 125)
Untreated uniforms 
(n = 143)
10% 24% 56% 
(21–76%)
[20] 2
Additional arm 
in Wojnarski 
(2016)
‘“ ““ ““ Permethrin-treated 
uniforms + partially 
effective prophylaxis 
(n = 130)
Untreated uniforms 
(n = 143)
15% 24% 35% 
(−7–61%)
[20] 2
Soto (1995), 
Columbia
3 Military RDBCT Permethrin-treated 
uniforms, socks and hat 
(n = 86)
Water-treatment of 
the same (n = 86)
3% 14% 75% 
(15–93%)
[70] 3
Rowland 
(1999), 
Pakistan
4 Afghan 
refugees
RCT (to 
household)
Permethrin-
impregnated 
headscarves/top sheets
(n = 438, 51 families)
Placebo EC 
formulation 
(n = 387, 51 
families)
25% 38% 36% 
(21–48%)
[71] 4
Kimani (2006), 
Kenya
5 Somali 
refugees
CR Permethrin-
impregnated clothing 
& sheets (n = 90)
Plain water-
impregnated 
clothing & sheets 
(n = 91)
38% 66% 43% 
(22–58%)
[72]
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First author 
and study 
location
Level of 
evidencea
Study 
population
Study Designb Intervention groups 
(n)
Control group (n) % Failure 
interventionc
% 
Failure 
control
Protective 
efficacy (95% 
CI)d
Reference/
notese
Eamsila (1994), 
Thailand
6 Military Unclear, 
probably CR
Permethrin-treated 
uniforms (n = 249)
Placebo-treated 
uniforms (n = 414)
27% 29% 4% 
(−23–26%)
[73] 5
Most (2016), 
French Guiana
7 Military Unclear 
“conditions 
identical”
Long-lasting polymer-
coated permethrin-
impregnated uniforms 
(n = 25)
Untreated uniforms 
(n = 125)
0% 9% 100%
(NA)
[74]
a1 is strongest, 7 least strong.
bCR: Cluster randomized trial, RDBCT: randomized, double blind clinical trial.
cNYA: Not yet available.
dNA: Not available.
eReference in [], notes by number: (1) Trial planned to execute in 2018, (2) True efficacy higher as estimate is confounded with Plasmodium vivax (Pv) relapses; efficacy only 
for Pv as Pf transmission was interrupted by interventions; final clinical study report pending. (3) Instructed to wear their uniforms day and night; under garments also 
treated, two adverse events in the permethrin arm requiring topical treatment but able to continue in study, no treatment needed in placebo arm; only trial with adverse 
events reported, (4) < 20 years had ~64% Pf protective efficacy, pooled efficacy underestimated because of Pv relapses, headscarf’s were worn by women outside during 
waking hours and used by the family as bed sheets at night, noted efficacy almost as good a treated bed nets in a prior trial in the same population. (5) Pv cases despite CQ 
prophylaxis indicated non-adherence; noted incomplete ability to monitoring uniform use, possible randomization leading to unequal exposure (e.g. permethrin-treated 
uniforms had more malaria than placebo in one area).
Table 2. Review of protective efficacy of permethrin treated clothing for malaria prevention.
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In conclusion, we urge donors and NMCEPs to help supporting security forces take action. This 
should include first to make sure security forces are using appropriate prevention and treatment 
packages. GMS security forces absolutely can directly support elimination operations. They best 
understand the mobile and migrant populations (MMPs) and terrain of the remaining forest 
in the region, understand military planning and have a structured workforce in many of the 
challenging areas. We call on donors to provide the leadership and funding by making sure that 
security forces are not a transmission reservoir and are engaged in the fight against malaria.
5. Utilize surveillance as a core intervention linked to results-based 
funding (SCI-RBF) to achieve rapid and effective action in actual 
transmission foci
5.1. Development of an innovative information (surveillance) system to eliminate 
emerging incurable malaria
In 2015–2016, our research team worked in two provinces in Vietnam (Figure 5) to field test 
a surveillance/information system envisioned in a background paper written for the BMGF 
[43]. We partnered with National Institute of Malariology, Parasitology and Entomology 
(NIMPE) and the Phu Yen Provincial Health Department (PHD) to develop and pilot test the 
information system linked to a pay-for-performance system. We also developed concepts to 
target forest malaria transmission foci and/or people traveling to these locations with effective 
integrated prevention and treatment.
5.1.1. 2015 results
We defined transmission locations, intervention usage, risk groups/factors and desired inter-
ventions. This was first done with a household survey of the identifiable malaria patients 
from the most recent 100 cases and a sample of nearby houses (Table 3). This table illustrates 
total cases and risk by work-type and that the reported use of program-provided long lasting 
insecticidal nets (LLINs) in actual transmission areas was very low [9]. For example, most 
malaria cases (49%) were coming from paper plantations, but farmers and charcoal produc-
ers were at higher risk (75 and 80%, respectively). LLIN and overall treated nets in use were 
only 6 and 19%, respectively. Households with malaria were ~three-fold less likely to use 
treated nets, Odds Ratio 3.2; p < 0.01) [76]. The actual transmission locations were determined 
by where people reported sleeping one to two weeks before they developed fever (malaria 
incubation period). The lack of transmission at the village level was confirmed by the lack of 
malaria patients who remained in the village during the incubation time for malaria.
These results were next confirmed and extended through geographic reconnaissance of sleep-
ing sites of malaria patients (Figure 6) [8, 9, 44]. At each sleeping site, GPS coordinates, with 
images the sleeping structure and the nets being used (if any), were captured (Figure 6). The 
pictures were used to validate self-reported data (e.g., Figures 7 and 8). Interviews revealed 
forest rangers reported taking partial malaria treatment when ill, malaria infection was com-
mon and lack of prevention measures for work in the forest at night. Based on this information, 
we suspected this population was the primary transmission reservoir in this area, similar to 
that recently reported from forest rangers in a nearby province [66].
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Figure 6 illustrates that actual forest transmission locations were readily identifiable; 80% 
were accessible within one hour by motorcycle. For the remaining 20%, the optimal placement 
of malaria posts to access those at risk was determined. The primary factors for low treated 
net use were the fact that 92% desired a hammock net (with few provided) and 83% desired 
a zip-type hammock net [76]. The hard-type LLINs that were provided were a type that was 
strongly disliked by 85% of those surveyed. Of the forest-goers surveyed, 89% reported they 
would be willing to use mosquito repellent and 91% malaria prophylaxis [76]. Based on these 
results, we believe the provision of nets of a type that people want to use, net retreatment 
Figure 5. Vietnam study districts in Quang Tri (Hung Hoa District) and Phu Yen Provinces (Dong Xuan District) (blue 
outlined areas).
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for self-purchased products, repellent availability, along with on-going education and use 
monitoring will enable high usage of an integrated prevention package.
Figure 6 also illustrates the smart-phone based information system, which greatly improved 
our ability to conduct near-real time data capture and quality control from Hanoi, while the 
team was working in the field. Information was captured using a smartphone app with the 
data fed into an on-line server when Internet access was available to the field staff. Ona.io 
server, KoboToolbox (http://www.kobotoolbox.org/) and other systems are inexpensive, 
easy-to-program/use, powerful new tools for the fight against malaria.
In Table 4, we outline the interventions we believe are needed for rapid malaria elimination. 
We illustrate linking of successful execution of the interventions to incentive pay, which was 
successfully pilot tested. Data captured from each intervention can constitute “surveillance as 
core intervention (SCI).” Incentive payments can be linked to the smartphone-captured data 
following quality checks. We believe surveillance as an intervention with results-based fund-
ing (SCI-RBF) will motivate staff to make sure patients complete antimalarial treatment and 
effectively intervene in transmission foci (both of which are still largely lacking).
Main work 
type
n Percent 
interviewed
Number 
of 
malaria 
cases
Percent 
total 
malaria 
(n = 93)
Percent 
risk 
malariaa
Nets currently 
used (n = 186)
Net types currently 
used (n = 189)
Any 
netb
At 
least a 
treated 
net 
typed
At least 
a zip 
hammock 
type
At least 
a LLIN 
type
Paper 
plantation
94 49% 44 47% 47% 65% 11% 41% 2%
Agarwood 
harvesting
39 21% 14 15% 36% 95% 15% 36% 8%
Farmer 16 8% 12 13% 75% 80% 80% 0% 38%
Trapper 16 8% 6 6% 38% 44% 25% 13% 6%
Charcoal 
production
10 5% 8 9% 80% 70% 0% 50% 0%
Timber 
harvesting
9 5% 4 4% 44% 33% 11% 11% 0%
Hunter 3 2% 3 3% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Other 3 2% 2 2% 67% 67% 67% 0% 0%
Total or mean 190 100% 93 100% 49% 68%c 19% 32% 6%
aCases of malaria/people interviewed.
bNumber reporting any net reported being used at forest sleeping site/number interviewed in work type.
cNumber reporting any net reported being used at forest sleeping site/total interviewed.
dProgram was providing annual net retreatment accounting for the difference between 6% for LLIN.
Table 3. Malaria-risk populations and bed net use in Phu Yen Province, Vietnam in 2015.
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Lastly, a concept was developed for a malaria elimination task force (METF) led and implemented 
by PHD staff, implemented by mobile malaria workers (MMWs). The METF should routinely have 
challenge-solving workshops with NMCEP staff to improve the quality of data and responses.
5.1.2. Conclusions
Despite very high household insecticide-treated net coverage, their use in risk areas is very 
low. Forest transmission sites are identifiable and targetable directly and/or at forest pathway 
points. The described transformative smart-phone based information technology will facili-
tate rapid malaria elimination allowing near real-time monitoring to improve the quality and 
targeting of interventions. Urgent action must be taken to improve the selection of interven-
tions of products benefitting people at risk and for those working in actual transmission areas.
5.1.3. Broader impact
Based in part on our work in 2015–2017, Phu Yen Province saw the largest drop (89%) in malaria 
of any province in the region of the south-central coast and central highlands in this time frame. 
In 2016, as cases decreased, the cases spatially clustered into two areas to prioritize (pink dots 
in Figure 9). In our study district, malaria reduction is striking. In 2017, only 13 cases were 
reported, compared to 52 (Figure 9), 133, 292, and 291 in the years 2016–2013, respectively, a 
Figure 6. Baseline malaria transmission location map with insecticide treated net (ITN) usage in Phu Yen Province, 
2015. The turquoise color represents 4700 households. In 2016, provincial health records showed 4.3 treated nets per 
household. Dots are the forest sleeping locations 1–2 weeks earlier, including 95% of 2015 cases. The color of the dots 
reveals very low use of nets in actual transmission areas, despite very high coverage in the village (where there was 
no transmission). The light purple circles are transmission foci, defined here as two cases within a 1 km radius, which 
captured 80% of all cases.
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96% reduction from baseline. The malaria lead for Phu Yen Province reported our contribution, 
noting the health staff “operated more effectively” during and following our project.
5.2. New approaches to “leap forward” to achieve more rapid malaria elimination
5.2.1. Development of a “Red-to-Green, Keep-it-Green” information system to achieve high 
adherence with both integrated vector control and treatment interventions
Based on what we learned in 2015, an information system using the “Red light-Green light” 
approach, as envisioned by Alan Magill, was developed. Based on 2015 case mapping 
(Figure 6), a simple system was developed to prioritize actual transmission areas for target-
ing interventions (Figure 10). The dot in each circle represents prevention status and the 
triangle treatment status in each focus. Those presented are treated net usage (dots) and time 
to ACT treatment (triangles), but must be enhanced to include both an integrated prevention 
and treatment package (Table 5).
Figure 7. Example use of smart phone technology to capture information, images and video linked to GPS coordinates. 
A. Smart phones with good data coverage are becoming ubiquitous, Ona.oi smartphone data capture; B. Ona.io internet 
interface; C. Transmission focus map with global positioning system (GPS) coordinates of sleeping locations of malaria 
patients; D-F. Pictures linked to GPS coordinates for quality control, D. Forest ranger station, E. How the net should look 
not how did it look, F. Tag on the net to confirm if it is an LLIN or not; G. Example of key data. All will allow for near-real 
time monitoring of intervention quality with regularly updated maps to allow malaria elimination staff, donors, and key 
leaders to understand what is happening where and when, from anywhere with internet access for the first time—this 
technology “changes the game”.
Towards Malaria Elimination - A Leap Forward60
One can visualize the low usage of treated bed nets (red dots). In addition, all but two sites 
are within one hour by motorcycle of a health center for ACT treatment (green triangles). The 
green triangles also reflect that most of the forest transmission sites are directly accessible for 
both responses to new cases and for on-going monitoring. The sites with an orange and a red 
triangle need proper placement of malaria posts or mobile malaria workers to capture people 
going deeper into the forest.
The map on the bottom of Figure 10 illustrates perfect, 100% “Green” status. We believe 
60–70% “Green” targets will be sufficient to rapidly eliminate malaria. These maps can be 
Figure 8. Image evidence of LLIN usage. A–C represent probable use and D-F, non-use. Note in E, chickens inside.
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regularly updated in an on-line information system for donors, national programs and imple-
menters to monitor progress near real-time.
5.2.2. Mitigation of forest malaria transmission with more effective and complete prevention/
treatment packages
We believe a more comprehensive prevention and treatment package targeting malaria trans-
mission foci, and the people working or traveling there, will have rapid impact, especially 
when those constituting the primary transmission reservoir are targeted. Pf must be the prior-
ity as this species is causing the public health emergency. Both Pf and Pv are transmitted by 
the same vector species. Pv remains a challenge for cure because of the dormant liver stage 
(hypnozoites). All of the prevention interventions will also be efficacious for control of Pv, and 
will drive down transmission in parallel. Pv residual transmission will often remain when Pf 
has been eliminated. The same resources can be used to mop up residual Pv transmission, 
which will also ensure that Pf has been truly eliminated.
ITNs are the cornerstone for malaria prevention worldwide, but have inadequate efficacy (e.g., 
in areas of unstable malaria transmission, 62 and 43% efficacy is reported with no or untreated 
nets for Pf prevention, respectively [77]). ITNs lack effect when not in use as illustrated by 
No. Intervention/item Descriptiona Cost/formb Cost/intervention/
caseb
Results-based 
funding (cost/year)b
1 Rapid case report, 
initial investigations 
and initial response
Full interview and 
interventions at initial 
patient encounter
$ 4.15 $ 4.15 $ 4149
2 Treatment plan and 
follow-up
Document adherence and 
late treatment success
$ 20.47 $ 51 $ 51,182
3.1 Foci response (Village) Screen & treat, treat nets, 
new nets, BCC
$ 3.75 $ 113 $ 67,500
3.2 Foci response (Forest) Screen & treat, treat nets, 
new nets, BCC, IT-ASSBA
$ 15.26 $ 305 $ 122,054
3.3 Foci response 
(Cross-border)
Screen & treat, treat nets, 
new nets, BCC, IT-ASSBA
$ 30.51 $ 610 $ 61,027
4 Foci monitoring Screen & treat, treat nets, 
new nets, BCC, IT-ASSBA
$ 7.63 $ 76 $ 76,284
5 Forest entry point/
work place monitoring
Screen & treat, treat nets, 
new nets, BCC, IT-ASSBA
$ 3.75 $ 38 $ 37,500
6 On-going provider 
quality monitoring
Routine visits to document 
diagnosis, treatment, 
prevention and reporting
$ 16.00 $ 2500 $ 30,000
Total $ 449,696
aScreen: screening with new highly sensitive rapid diagnostic tests (hsRDTs); BCC: behavior change communication; 
IT-ASSBA: insecticide treatment around sleeping, sitting, sleeping and bathing areas (most sleeping structures are huts 
without walls).
bThese are example costs; true costs will be estimated in the field in Cambodia from May–August 2018. Some of these 
costs are currently provided as travel incentives and monthly stipends for field staff which are not focused on results; 
the estimates do not include commodities.
Table 4. Example of surveillance as an intervention with results-based funding (SCI-RBF) for the first year of imple-
mentation.
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Durnez and Coosemans [78] (Figure 11). Additional tools are available—achieving adherence 
with all prevention tools is the critical challenge, which we believe can be addressed with 
SCI-RBF (see Section 5.1.1).
In Table 5, immediately available prevention and treatment measures are outlined. We believe 
the use of treated nets can be greatly increased in actual transmission areas with smart phone 
Figure 9. Actual malaria transmission locations by year in Dong Xuan District, Phu Yen Province, Vietnam. Please note 
the marked clustering of the pink dots as malaria transmission decreased in 2016 to 52 cases from 133 in 2015. Based 
in part on our effort to demonstrate actual transmission locations and lack of treated nets at these sites, malaria cases 
continued to decrease to 13 cases in 2017 (a 96% reduction from baseline in 2013-2014).
Prevention Treatment
>90% using a treated net Complete treatment and follow-up
Treated clothing Targeted malaria posts to forest entry points
Mosquito repellent Mobile malaria workers to access hot-spots
Safer sleeping, sitting and bathing areas Screening with highly sensitive RDTs
Each of these measures has partial efficacy—they must be used in combination with adherence monitoring to achieve 
high effectiveness. With all drugs soon to be lost, a focus must be placed on use of an integrated vector control package. 
New vector control products are also in the pipeline, which should be added when effectiveness is demonstrated.
Table 5. Immediately available interventions for integrated prevention and treatment in transmission foci.
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monitoring. The SCI-RBF will also allow iterative testing and improvement of methods until 
high usage is achieved, both with ITNs and an integrated vector control package. There is 
now direct evidence of substantial efficacy of permethrin-treated uniforms in the Cambodian 
Figure 10. “Red-to-Green, Keep-it-Green” information system (see https://ConsortiumHA.org); (a) the blue circles are 
transmission areas to prioritize; here classified as 2 cases within a 1 km radius, which captured 80% of cases.  Within 
the blue circles, a small circle represents the prevention package and a triangle represents the treatment package.  The 
top of this figure represents the actual status of Dong Xuan District, Phu Yen Province, Vietnam in 2015. The prevention 
package was only the use of a treated net or not, and the treatment package was only time to access effective malaria 
treatment.  As you can see, treated net use is poor, but all but two triangles are green, illustrating that all but two 
transmission foci are within one hour of a health center by motorcycle.  This also means they are directly accessible 
for interventions, both when a new case occurs and for on-going monitoring of use of malaria elimination tools. (b) the 
theoretical desired 100% green status. 100% will never by achieved – we believe perhaps 60-70% usage of an integrated 
prevention and treatment package will be enough to rapidly reduce transmission.
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military, including contributing to the interruption of Pf transmission [20]. The literature-
based evidence of efficacy of permethrin-treated clothing is presented in Table 2. Based on the 
available data and the growing body of evidence that those working in the forest at night in 
the GMS are a significant transmission reservoir, we believe treated uniforms/clothing should 
be scaled up as rapidly as possible. We believe retreatment of clothing, self-purchased nets and 
insecticide treatment around sleeping, sitting and bathing areas (IT-ASSBA) should be routine 
in hot-spots. Re-treatment will also allow for on-going education and monitoring. Treated net-
ting when used with partial coverage in sleeping areas has been shown to reduce An. dirus (the 
main forest vector in the GMS) bites by 50% in Eastern Vietnam (Marchand R, unpublished 
data). Some efficacy has also been seen for other insecticide-treated products [79, 80].
Topical insect repellent clearly prevents mosquito bites when used correctly, especially for 
outdoor biting mosquitoes such as An. dirus that are otherwise hard to control with traditional 
indoor methods (ITN, IRS); however, getting people to regularly use the product in risk areas 
(be adherent or compliant) is the challenge, probably being the primary factor leading to a 
lack of efficacy in recent trials in the GMS [81]. Locally available DEET-containing repellent 
was well accepted and prevented An. dirus bites in forest transmission areas all night in a 
single application in Eastern Vietnam (Marchand R, unpublished data).
Prompt, complete and correct treatment is the cornerstone for malaria therapy. The effective ACT 
regimen should be used for both Pf and Pv blood stages. Primaquine in standard dosages should 
be used for Pf gametocytes and Pv hypnozoites in countries where these doses are already being 
used as standard of care (e.g., Vietnam) or low-dose [82] for Pf gametocytes in areas where there 
are safety concerns. We believe that all patients in the GMS should have visits on days 28 and 
42 to detect late-treatment failure, as well as to have malaria patients and their work groups be 
transmission-stopping ambassadors. In addition, improved tools are just becoming available to 
Figure 11. Protection “gap” when only indoor insecticide-based vector control measures are applied. Anopheles 
mosquitoes bite between 6 PM and 6 AM. A “gap” exists while people are not sleeping (A) and for people conducting 
night-time outdoor activities (B) (courtesy of Durnez and Coosemans [78]). Additional note: even the green part of the 
figure is also often red in the GMS because of lack of use of ITNs in risk areas (see Figures 6 and 10).
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identify asymptomatic malaria carriers through active case detection (ACD). The BMGF funded the 
development of a highly sensitive rapid diagnostics test (hsRDT), which is specific for Pf [83]. It is 
much more sensitive than standard rapid diagnostic tests (RDT), but not as sensitive as PCR (which 
is probably not necessary) [84, 85]. Alere (www.alere.com, now Abbott) has made these hsRDTs 
commercially available for $0.95/each; approvals in GMS are in process. The same company also 
markets a malaria antibody-based RDT for both Pf and Pv [86]. The usefulness of these new tools 
can be rapidly demonstrated during scale-up; the hsRDT will hopefully obviate the need for mass 
drug administration [87]. Both of these new RDTs should facilitate defining risk populations.
If the package of available tools does not rapidly stop malaria transmission, other more aggres-
sive tools can be added as they become available [85]. Currently available drugs are problematic 
for prophylaxis—primaquine and doxycycline require daily dosing; doxycycline has already 
been widely used along the Vietnam border—its current efficacy is unknown. Mefloquine is 
poorly tolerated and its use for prophylaxis may accelerate its demise. Tafenoquine [88, 89] and 
RTS,S malaria vaccine [90] should be accelerated to play a role for prevention in the region.
The last remaining parasites will be the most drug-resistant—alternative regimens are urgently 
needed. Tafenoquine [91] (unpublished observations for Pf), azithromycin and methylene blue 
[92–95] are currently under recognized, but could also play a role in combination treatment 
when no alternatives remain, which may be very soon. New regimens should be urgently evalu-
ated; all should be seven days, as some or all of the drugs will have short half-lives. With seven-
day regimens, adherence will be very challenging. Hospitalization with appropriate incentives 
should become the norm to achieve very high treatment adherence in the near future, including 
the current three-day regimens in areas where outpatient treatment monitoring is not successful.
6. Conclusion/call to action
Emerging incurable malaria in the GMS is a grave public health threat. We call for targeted, 
immediate decisive action by international and host country governments to establish mission 
leadership, enough authority, respect, and expertise at each operational level. Security forces 
must be engaged. Commitment and a real sense of urgency will be most effectively achieved 
with a PHEIC. We call on the major donors (BMGF, United States Agency for International 
Development, ADB, the US military) and other philanthropists/donors to fulfill the need for 
efficient funding. In this chapter, we have proposed the methodology to achieve elimination 
of the nearly incurable malaria parasites “East of Bangkok” near the WHO target of 2020 [24]. 
With the currently available tools, each partially effective, but when used together with smart 
phone-based quality monitoring of appropriate use in the actual transmission areas—we 
believe the mission can be accomplished near the target date. We call for the critical actions, 
focusing resources to where they will have most impact to help prevent the next pandemic.
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